

## Media Report 17 Dec 2021

This weeks media reports will cover and answer great questions veterans are still asking such as Frequently asked questions regarding COVID-19 in Ottawa. Due to ongoing and evolving COVID-19 pandemic callers may experience increased wait times when calling the Government of Canada Pension Center. Callers may also experience dropped calls, as all telecommunication networks across Canada are presently facing capacity challenges. and local Media Articles and An illness or injury can have an impact on your ability to adjust to life after service. We all need healthcare services. The Treatment benefits program provides coverage for a variety of benefits and services to help you get—and stay healthy. Have you made an application for disability benefits from Veterans Affairs Canada and received a decision? If you disagree with that decision, you have the right to review or appeal

## Canada

<b>Total Percentage of population vaccinated</b>	<b>Total Percentage of population fully vaccinated</b>	<b>Eligible (5+) Percentage of population vaccinated</b>	<b>Eligible (5+) Percentage of population fully vaccinated</b>	
82.27%	76.29%	86.54%	80.25%	
+0.39%	+0.02%	+0.41%	+0.03%	
<b>Total doses administered</b>	<b>First doses</b>	<b>Second doses</b>	<b>Third+ doses</b>	<b>Received doses administered</b>
62,900,140	31,456,580	29,169,266	2,274,294	87.68%
+292,507	+149,979	+9,202	+133,326	+0.41%

### Presidents Christmas Message 2021

The gift of love.

The gift of peace.

The gift of happiness.

May all these be yours at Christmas.

On behalf of myself and the Board of Directors, thank you for all your support and guidance this year. Our thoughts are also with those Canadians that can't be with those dearest to them at this time, whether that be through their duties, either here or overseas.

The Christmas holiday affords each of us time for gratitude and introspection. We can take stock of all we have accomplished for our Veterans, and all that remains to be done. May this wonderful time of the year touch your hearts in a special way. Wishing you all much happiness not just today, but throughout the New Year.

From our bubble to yours, we wish you a very Merry Christmas and a happy New Year. Stay safe and take good care of yourselves – we are entering the season to be “Jolly Careful”!

## **Randy**

Randy Stowell, CD  
National President

### Major Jorma [Hammy} Hamalainen Retires

Major Jorma [Hammy} Hamalainen, MMM CD will retire from the CAF on 31 Dec 2021 after 42 plus years of service. He will remain active with the NVOC, (NATO Vets of Canada) as a Board of Directors, Veterans Transition Advisor. He has been nominated for participation on one of six Ministers Advisory Boards and we wait for an announcement.

On behalf of all our members, and the Directors, I extend hearty congratulations to Hammy and his wife Karen for their service, and wish him and Karen much happiness in retirement.

Hammy I enjoyed our time together at LFWA HQ, Ted B

Randy

## **NATO NEWS AND THOUGHTS [From SHELLDRAKE] 17 DECEMBER 2021**

[https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-future-of-natos-strategic-concept/?tpa=MjEzODQ2OTEyMjAxZjBmNTFhZTVkYjE2NDAYzM2MThkNjlxYWE&utm\\_source=newsletter&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-future-of-natos-strategic-concept/?tpa=MjEzODQ2OTEyMjAxZjBmNTFhZTVkYjE2NDAYzM2MThkNjlxYWE&utm\\_content&utm\\_campaign=PAID%20-%20Everything%20as%20it%27s%20published](https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-future-of-natos-strategic-concept/?tpa=MjEzODQ2OTEyMjAxZjBmNTFhZTVkYjE2NDAYzM2MThkNjlxYWE&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-future-of-natos-strategic-concept/?tpa=MjEzODQ2OTEyMjAxZjBmNTFhZTVkYjE2NDAYzM2MThkNjlxYWE&utm_content&utm_campaign=PAID%20-%20Everything%20as%20it%27s%20published)

The Future of NATO's Strategic Concept December 13, 2021

The debate leading up to new documents is as important as the documents themselves.

By: Antonia Colibasanu

2022 will bring two major diplomatic events for the trans-Atlantic community. First, in March, the European Union will adopt its Strategic Compass, a document meant to establish a common view on EU security and defense and thus to define, however vaguely, the notion of Europe's "strategic autonomy." Then at the Madrid Summit in June, NATO will adopt its new Strategic Concept, which lays out the strategy of the alliance, outlining its purpose and its fundamental security tasks and identifying challenges and opportunities it faces in the changing security environment. And as with all such documents, they serve a political purpose too in that they signal to the world how the EU and NATO see defense, security and trans-Atlantic ties.

But the debate leading up to the signing of the documents is more important than the final wording. The questions raised between now and then and the discussions over their answers paint a new European reality taking shape, one that could give way to increased bilateralism or close regional coordination within NATO and between specific member states on core strategic issues.

## The Past

The end of the Cold War gave NATO and the EU a unique opportunity to expand eastward. The costs of doing so were minimal, the benefits of globalization were many, and the absence of a regional challenger made it relatively safe. But as Russia and China grew into regional powers, and as the 2008 economic crisis exposed the weaknesses of globalization, the EU and NATO needed to adapt to new global realities.

The EU has responded by restructuring itself as best it can, a process complicated by the struggle to maintain consensus between members that don't share many interests. NATO, a military organization dominated by a non-European power, has adapted by developing political functions that ensure the collaboration and coordination of member states and, since 2008, a practical focus on building up its eastern flank and the containment line between the Baltic and the Black Sea.

During that time, the definition of "defense and security" has come to be very different for Eastern and Western Europe. A resurgent Russia was a matter of national security for the eastern EU member states, so they have spent more to increase military capabilities in NATO. Western EU member states have struggled with economic problems and migration flows from Africa and the Middle East, things that NATO can do little about. Meanwhile, the reality of China becoming a regional power in Asia has increased U.S. concerns about the Pacific. This, in turn, made Washington ask for the Europeans to up their game in NATO and ensure

their own security. With a post-Brexit U.K. seeking to renew ties with the Commonwealth and becoming more interested in the Pacific too, the EU (especially its western members) seems to have had a stark realization that security is an internal and urgent priority for its development.

France has proposed that the EU develop a common stance with regard to security and defense. France will hold the EU's rotating presidency in the first six months of 2022, and President Emmanuel Macron announced Dec. 9 that among the French priorities for the coming months is to increase the EU's ability to defend its borders. At the same time, a conference on defense was announced by the president of the European Commission ahead of the Strategic Compass signing in March. Time and again, the term "strategic autonomy" has come up as the solution for building the EU's security and defense. Expect it to do the same in the coming months.

## The Present

It's an important concept because, as we said earlier, member states have different threats. Some of those threats change – indeed, many have under the frailty and uncertainty of the post-2008 global economy – but some do not. Some are more appropriately mitigated by one institution rather than another. For example, the nature of the threats against Eastern Europe, and by extension against the U.S., involve growing Russian influence, including a military buildup, in the east. The solution for such a threat relates to defense and deterrence and therefore falls under NATO's purview rather than the EU's. Western and Southern Europeans are facing socio-economic security issues, something that falls under the EU's umbrella and calls for Brussels to deliver a solution.

Unsurprisingly, the debate over the Strategic Concept and the meaning of strategic autonomy will be a function of members' divergent interests. And the resolution is even more complex than it first appears. For one thing, Europe's security environment is deteriorating thanks in part to socio-economic problems, including migration, brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. These problems will affect different EU countries differently – which means the negotiation process between the west and the east and the north and the south needs to ensure a balance between all member states' interests.

Then there is the U.S., which has by far the strongest military of all NATO members. There is growing pressure in the United States for Washington to resolve some problems of its own. Europeans need to make sure that the U.S. can maintain its security guarantee to Europe past the eastern flank, where Washington has a strategic interest in curbing Russian influence. Promising to

increase defense spending, as many members have, is a good way to keep the U.S. engaged, but that works only for so long. Europe is thus under pressure to spend real money on real defense measures at an economically tough time.

Third, everyone in NATO and in Europe has different interests in the Indo-Pacific. France, for example, has openly complained about the U.K. working against its interests in the Pacific, while admitting that the EU would need to work with the U.K. on all matters concerning migration. The U.K. has been supportive of, and has even contributed to, the eastern flank build-up. More, Europe's relations to China are shaping policy in the Indo-Pacific – and while most Eastern European states are standing by the U.S., not all are.

Finally – and perhaps most importantly – there is semantics, for with semantics come political interpretations. There are important distinctions between the French and the English meanings of the word “autonomy,” which have already created tensions and misunderstandings. The Anglophiles – those who prefer English as their language of choice (count the Eastern Europeans in this group) – understand autonomy to be “independence” in the sense of equality to the other players, while the Francophiles understand it to mean “authority” or “decentralization,” in the sense of self-government over the matter of defense. Indeed, building a “European Army” or a “sovereign” European defense that's completely independent from and equal to the U.S. remains impossible for many years to come. Autonomy, in the Francophile sense of building a stronger European role within the framework of the Atlantic alliance, can be seen as a metaphor for increased European responsibility. This would be particularly helpful if Europeans have the ambition, as they suggested through recent speeches and papers, to act as credible high-end first responders in and around Europe in an emergency in which U.S. forces might be engaged elsewhere by 2030.

The debate on semantics is raising another question: Are we talking about the EU or about European strategic responsibility? The way the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is set up allows the EU to modestly undertake crisis response operations. Challenging scenarios of engagement and deterrence need the support of NATO, as well as the U.S. and the U.K. Therefore, if strategic autonomy is to be built on the CSDP's foundation, there would be a need to reinforce the practical relationships established between CSDP and so-called third countries. This would establish the mechanism for the EU to access NATO assets and structures. But such discussions are likely to be complex since they would refer to practical manners that would make the NATO-EU partnership operational.

The Future

For European strategic autonomy or European responsibility to grow within NATO as France proposes, Paris needs to secure the buy-in of London and Berlin. The new German government has suggested it will fulfill NATO's defense investment pledge and that it's dedicated to NATO's plans. Berlin will be the first to worry about the political interpretation of the term autonomy and emphasize the need for unity in Europe. For Germany, any discussion about European "sovereignty" is acceptable if it is linked to NATO and its defense capabilities. The U.K., meanwhile, is negotiating its stance with the EU and is trying to build bilateral ties with European countries like Poland and others outside Europe, but it is convinced that Europe needs to increase its strategic responsibility within NATO by the operational status quo of the alliance. And yet it has no interest in prioritizing the buildup, as it can simply retreat behind its increasingly capable navy and its nuclear deterrent and continue to refocus beyond Continental Europe.

Of all NATO members, the U.S. is the most interested in a more strategically responsible Europe. Washington has been saying as much since the Obama administration. The benefits are fairly obvious. Europeans could take on more responsibility for the Western Mediterranean and parts of North Africa and make collective defense possible with no need for American divisions to rush to the rescue. And even if the current discussions fail, bilateral relations or regional alliances within both the EU and NATO are set to prevail.

The debate around the NATO Strategic Concept, along with the one on European strategic autonomy, is complex and challenging. Considering the current socio-economic problems that the U.S. and Europe are facing, it is not only hard to reach consensus, given the multitude of issues that countries are facing, but it is also difficult for discussions to even be interpreted the same way. However, if the debate leads to a compromise that facilitates increased European responsibility through strategic autonomy, it promises the opportunity of a renewed bond between the U.S. and Europe.

—  
—

## **Compensation for illness or injury**

Financial payment provided for a service-related illness or injury.

### **Disability benefits**

Compensation to recognize that your injury or illness is a result of your service.

### **Critical injury benefit**

A lump-sum payment that recognizes the immediate impact of the most severe and traumatic service-related injuries or diseases.

### **Caregiver recognition benefit**

A monthly payment for an informal caregiver, such as a family member or friend, who provides you with daily personal care support.

### **Additional Pain and Suffering Compensation**

Monthly payments in recognition of any severe and permanent disability, related to your military service, which creates a barrier to life after service.

### **Exceptional incapacity allowance**

Additional monthly payment for a disability pensioner if your illness or injury impacts your quality of life.

### **Attendance allowance**

If you receive a disability pension you may qualify for payments to help cover the costs of an attendant.

### **Clothing allowance**

If you receive a disability pension you may qualify for a monthly tax-free clothing allowance.

Rehabilitation Program: Let's chat! / Le programme de réadaptation : parlons-en!

•(Le français suit)

Hello,

Are you a Veteran or family member with experience in our Rehabilitation Program? If so, we want to connect with you to hear how we can improve our rehabilitation services. Please [reach out](#) by 3 January 2022 to share your thoughts and perspectives.

We are looking for a broad group of Veterans and their families including those who identify as Indigenous, members of a racialized group, LGBTQ2+and/or persons with a disability to ensure our rehabilitation service delivery is inclusive and equitable.

Over the next several months, you will be invited to virtual discussions in the official language of your choice. Our goal is to understand how proposed changes to the Rehabilitation Program would affect program participants. Sessions will last 30 minutes to an hour.

In your email, please include any accessibility requirements you may have so that we can best support your participation.

Know a Veteran or family member who may want to chat? Tell them about this opportunity too, so that everyone has the chance to participate.

Sincerely,

Stakeholder Engagement and Outreach Team

Veterans Affairs Canada

[vac.engagement.acc@veterans.gc.ca](mailto:vac.engagement.acc@veterans.gc.ca)

\*\*\*\*\*

Bonjour,

Êtes-vous un vétéran ou un membre de la famille ayant une expérience de notre programme de réadaptation? Dans l'affirmative, nous souhaitons que vous nous disiez comment nous pouvons améliorer nos services de réadaptation.

Veuillez [communiquer](#) d'ici le 3 janvier 2022 pour faire part de vos idées et points de vue.

Nous sommes à la recherche d'un vaste groupe de vétérans et de membres de leur famille, y compris ceux qui s'identifient comme Autochtones, membres d'un groupe racialisé, LGBTQ2+ et personnes handicapées, pour nous assurer que la prestation des services de réadaptation est inclusive et équitable.

Au cours des mois à venir, nous vous inviterons à participer à des discussions virtuelles dans la langue officielle de votre choix. Notre but est de comprendre les répercussions des changements proposés au programme de réadaptation sur les participants au programme. Les séances dureront entre 30 minutes et une heure.



Dans votre courriel, veuillez indiquer tout besoin en matière d'accessibilité afin que nous puissions faciliter le plus possible votre participation.

Vous connaissez un vétéran ou un membre de la famille qui voudrait peut-être en parler? Informez-les de cette occasion aussi, afin que tout le monde ait la chance de participer.

Cordialement,

L'équipe de Mobilisation et sensibilisation des intervenants

Anciens Combattants Canada

[vac.engagement.acc@veterans.gc.ca](mailto:vac.engagement.acc@veterans.gc.ca)

## STAY IN TOUCH WITH THESE CF NEWSPAPERS

---

### **Base/Wing — Newspaper**

14 Wing Greenwood — <a href="#">The Aurora</a>	17 Wing Winnipeg — <a href="#">The Voxair</a>
22 Wing North Bay — <a href="#">The Shield</a>	CFB Halifax — <a href="#">The Trident</a>
4 Wing Cold Lake — <a href="#">The Courier</a>	CFB Edmonton — <a href="#">The Western Sentinel</a>
CFB Esquimalt — <a href="#">The Lookout</a>	CFB Valcartier — <a href="#">The Adsum</a>
CFSU Ottawa — <a href="#">The Guard</a>	CFB Kingston — <a href="#">Garrison News</a>
CFB Shilo — <a href="#">The Shilo Stag</a>	CFB St Jean — <a href="#">The Servir</a>
19 Wing Comox — <a href="#">The Totem Times</a>	3 Wing Bagotville — <a href="#">The Vortex</a>
8 Wing Trenton — <a href="#">The Contact</a>	CFB Borden — <a href="#">The Citizen</a>
CFB Petawawa — <a href="#">The Petawawa Post</a>	

---

## IN THE NEWS

[Armed Forces helicopter crew met with grilled cheese and kindness after being grounded along Fraser River](#)

[Recrutement dans l'armée : Militaires recherch \(e\)s](#)

[Modification made to Basic Military Qualification Land and Development Period 2](#)

[Petition calling on Government to reclassify Persian Gulf War to Wartime Service](#)

[Encore un haut gradé de l'armée accusé d'agression sexuelle](#)

[Stories of Black Canadian veterans the focus of new website](#)

[On target: CAF is not immune from historical scrutiny](#)

[Les géants de l'armement épargnés par la crise économique de la COVID-19](#)

[Russian MoD receives mine clearance UGV](#)